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Introduction
This paper discusses the neo-logicist approach to the foundations of mathematics by highlighting
an issue that arises from looking at the Bad Company objection from an epistemological
perspective.  For the most part, our issue is (mainly) independent of the details of any resolution
of the Bad Company objection and it concerns other foundational approaches in the philosophy
of mathematics.
After giving a very brief overview of the “Scottish” neo-logicist school, we present a
generic form of the Bad Company objection and introduce an epistemic issue that goes with it. 
Then we present an alternative approach to the philosophy of mathematics, a view that emerges
from Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie [1899].  This highlights the fact that Bad Company-
style worries, and our concomitant epistemic issue, affect different conceptions within the
philosophy of mathematics.  We then offer various ways to address the epistemic concern,
arguing that none resolves the issue.  The final section offers our own resolution which,
however, runs against the foundationalist spirit of the Scottish neo-logicist program.
1 The Scottish neo-logicist program
The Scottish neo-logicist program is to introduce mathematical theories via abstraction
principles.  The generic form of a second-order abstraction principle is:
(ABS)     "F"G((F)=(G)  E(F,G)),
where  is a higher-order operator, denoting a function from properties (or concepts, or sets, or
whatever is in the range of the monadic second-order variables) to individual objects, and E is an
equivalence relation over properties (or concepts, or sets, or whatever).
The founding instance of the program is an abstraction now known as Hume’s Principle
(HP):
2(HP)     "F"G(#F=#G   (FG)),
where ‘#F’ is the cardinal number of F, and ‘FG’ is the statement that the F’s are
equinumerous with the G’s.  Hume’s Principle and second-order logic suffices to derive the
Peano axioms and so to account for arithmetic.
The program is to understand abstraction principles as a special form of implicit
definition which, when successful, are true by stipulation.  Abstraction principles, so conceived,
are meant to account for a priori knowledge of arithmetic, analysis and, hopefully, set theory. 
Our focus is thus on the epistemological aspects of Scottish neo-logicism, the claims concerning
the nature of mathematical knowledge.  Other versions of logicism and neo-logicism have a
more metaphysical focus, concerning the nature of mathematical truth.  For example, some take
the program to be that arithmetic is a body of conceptual truths.  The present paper does not
directly address those metaphysical concerns.
2 The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Company
The Bad Company objection is best seen as aimed at the epistemological aspects of neo-
logicism.  The original form of the objection is that abstraction principles cannot be a legitimate
way to introduce mathematical theories, since some of them are inconsistent.  The most
notorious example, of course, is Gottlob Frege’s own Basic Law V:
"F"G(ExtF=ExtG    "x(FxGx)).
In like manner, an analogous abstraction on well-orderings (or relations generally) is
inconsistent, falling to the Burali-Forti paradox.  The argument is that if (HP) is good purely
based on its form—if (HP) can ground knowledge of a branch of mathematics—then so are these
other ones, since they have the same form (ABS).  However, Basic Law V cannot be used to
found a theory of sets or extensions, and an ordinal abstraction principle cannot be used to
introduce a theory of ordinals (Weir [1998], and dialetheism, ala Priest [1987], notwithstanding). 
So (HP) cannot be used to introduce a theory of cardinal numbers, or so the argument goes.
Neil Tennant [1987, 236-7] raises an early formulation of the objection.  He notes that
the account of arithmetic developed by Crispin Wright [1983] may “with justice be called a
3naive theory of number”.  Tennant adds that this “is not to say that [Wright’s theory] is
inconsistent; it is only to stress the analogy with the naive theory of sets”, based on Basic Law
V.
Much of the contemporary discussion of the objection traces to articulations due to
Michael Dummett [1991, 188-189] and George Boolos [1997].  Retrospectively, Dummett
[1998, 375] observed the following:
My complaint was the obvious one. In Grundgesetze, value-ranges are introduced in a
manner precisely analogous to that in which Wright argued, in his book, that Frege ought
to have introduced the cardinal numbers . . . :  and yet it was so far from being justified as
to lead to actual contradiction.  It therefore could not be maintained that this procedure is,
in and of itself, legitimate.
The problem, according to Dummett, is that the neo-logicist procedure of stipulating abstraction
principles cannot be regarded as reliable in generating knowledge-grounding statements.
Clearly, this is not a knock-down argument.  Rather it raises a challenge, as Dummett
[1998] continues:  “Possibly some restriction, distinguishing the case of cardinal numbers from
that of value-ranges could be framed.  But Wright had put forward no such restriction; and hence
his thesis, as it stood, could not be sound.”  And so the hunt was on to find appropriate
constraints or restrictions to separate “good” cases—the knowledge-grounding abstraction
principles—from the “bad” ones, and so resolve the Bad Company objection.
Consistency seems to be a necessary condition for a good abstraction (again, dialetheism
notwithstanding).  This suffices to separate Basic Law V and the ordinal abstraction from
Hume’s Principle.  Yet, consistency alone is not enough to deal with other “bad” cases that were
put forth by Richard Heck [1992],  Boolos [1997], and Wright [1997] himself.  Heck, for
example, proposes a scheme:
(He)   "F"G(EF = EG  ( Ú "x(FxGx))),
where  is a closed sentence in the second-order language, with no non-logical terminology.  It
is easy to see that the embedded formula [ Ú "x(FxGx)] defines an equivalence relation, and
so (He) is in the form (ABS).  Heck observed that (He) is satisfiable only if  is.  Indeed
(He) entails .  If  is the statement that there are no more than finitely many objects, then
(He) is satisfiable only on finite domains.  In contrast, (HP) is satisfiable only on (Dedekind)
1See Wright’s and John MacFarlane’s contribution to this special issue.
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infinite domains, since it implies the existence and uniqueness of each natural number.  So (HP)
and (He) cannot both be true.
Similarly, Boolos’s [1997] Parity Principle and Wright’s [1997] Nuisance Principle are
both satisfiable on any finite domain, but each of them is inconsistent with (HP) since neither is
satisfiable on an infinite domain.  In addition, Alan Weir [2003] has formulated a series of so-
called “distraction principles”.  One of those is satisfiable only on limits in the series of
inaccessible cardinals and another is satisfiable only on successors in the series of inaccessible
cardinals.  Again, only some of the distractions can be good, otherwise we end up with what
Weir calls the “embarrassment of riches”: there are too many presumably acceptable principles
for them all to be acceptable.  Clearly, then, unless further, well-motivated constraints are
offered to isolate the “good” principles, the procedure of the neo-logicist has to be regarded as
unreliable and so futile.
Over the last decade or so, this debate has seen various epicycles, producing constraints
(conservativeness, modesty, stability/irenicity) on legitimate (“good”) abstraction principles, and
the logical relations among those constraints have been studied.  It is perhaps fair for a neutral
observer to conclude that the jury is still out on whether the Bad Company objection can be
met—hence this special issue.
There is a closely related matter, which we contentiously label Good Company.  Once the
right criteria have been identified to rule out mutually inconsistent statements, why is it that only
abstraction principles such as Hume’s Principle are “good” and not also other postulations, such
as the Dedekind-Peano axioms?  In other words, why is the neo-logicist procedure—that of
stipulating certain sentences to express truths—only applicable to abstraction principles, and not
also to other statements of a different form?1
Stipulations of sentences that are not of the form of an abstraction principle will prove
important for us, largely for purposes of illustration and to broaden the scope of Bad Company
and its ultimate resolution. Yet, we are here not directly concerned with the exact criteria to
separate the good postulations from the bad ones (i.e. Bad Company), nor with the scope of the
5good cases is (i.e., Good Company).  Our focus instead is on the question of what—provided that
the criteria for a stipulation to be good are understood—is the epistemic status of these criteria. 
That is, what does a theorist, say Wright’s [1998] character “Hero”, have to know or justifiably
believe about the relevant criteria in order to acquire mathematical knowledge on the basis of
abstraction principles or other stipulations?  This issue turns out to be more problematic than one
might think, and it is here that we think that the Bad Company objection turns ugly.  Also, we
believe that it is an issue that applies beyond the neo-logicist program, and affects other
epistemic foundationalist enterprises in the philosophy of mathematics.  But, as we will see, it
proves particularly ugly with respect to the neo-logicist approach.
3 The use of implicit definition in Hilbert’s early program
It will prove instructive to consider another perspective on at least some branches of
mathematics that also invokes stipulations of sentences, i.e. implicit definitions.  These have
roughly the same foundationalist outlook as the neo-logicist adopts with respect to legitimate
abstraction principles.  As we will see, these implicit definitions have their own Bad
Company–style issues.  Seeing how those are resolved in philosophical theory and in
mathematical practice sheds light on the similar (perhaps identical) issue concerning neo-logicist
abstractions.
David Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie [1899] marked the culmination of a trend
toward formalization in geometry.  Hilbert was aware that, at some level, spatial intuition or
observation remained the source of the axioms of geometry.  In his Grundlagen, however, the
role of intuition or observation is limited to motivation and heuristic.  The book does not contain
the phrase “implicit definition”, but at least with hindsight, it is clear that it delivers, and is based
upon, implicit definitions of geometric structures.  The early pages contain phrases like “the
axioms of this group define the idea expressed by the word ‘between’ . . .” and “the axioms of
this group define the notion of congruence or motion”.  The idea is summed up as follows:
We think of . . . points, straight lines, and planes as having certain mutual relations,
which we indicate by means of such words as “are situated”, “between”, “parallel”,
“congruent”, “continuous”, etc.  The complete and exact description of these relations
follows as a consequence of the axioms of geometry.
2“Lebensgeschichte” in Hilbert [1935, 388-429]; the story is related on p. 403.  See Stein [1988,
253], Coffa [1991, 135], and Hallett [1990, 201-2].
3The much discussed correspondence between Frege and Hilbert is published in Frege [1976]
and translated in Frege [1980].
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Of course, Hilbert also says that the axioms express “certain related fundamental facts of
our intuition”, but in the mathematical development, all that remains of this “intuitive content” is
the use of words like “point”, “line”, etc., and perhaps the diagrams that accompany some of the
theorems.
One key idea is that the axiomatizations—stipulations—of the Grundlagen are free-
standing, in the sense that anything at all can play the role of the undefined primitives of points,
lines, planes, etc., so long as the axioms are satisfied.  Otto Blumenthal reports that in a
discussion in a Berlin train station in 1891, Hilbert said that in a proper axiomatization of
geometry, “one must always be able to say, instead of ‘points, straight lines, and planes’, ‘tables,
chairs, and beer mugs’.”2  The connection to intuition or observation is broken for good.  This
approach bled into other areas of mathematics, such as arithmetic and analysis.
An implicit definition, in this sense, is the presentation of some axioms that contain one
or more “primitive” terms.  In the case of geometry, these might be “point”, “line”, and “plane”. 
In the case of arithmetic, the primitives might be “number”, “successor”, “plus”, and “times”. 
The axiomatization characterizes the relations among the primitives, and only the relations
among the primitives.  Let us call this a “Hilbert-style implicit definition”.  It is similar to a
functional definition in the philosophy of mind (see Shapiro [1997, Chapter 3, §6]).  In
mathematics, if an implicit definition of this type is successful, then at least one structure is
characterized by it, and the axioms are true of the structures, or structure, so characterized.
Frege himself objected to Hilbert’s deployment of implicit definitions.3  At least Hilbert’s
side of this dispute sheds some light on the perspective under study here.  In a letter dated
December 27, 1899, Frege articulated a traditional view concerning axioms and definitions.  He
claimed that in Hilbert [1899],
7. . . the meanings of the words “point”, “line”, “between” are not given, but are assumed
to be known in advance . . . [I]t is also left unclear what you call a point.  One first thinks
of points in the sense of Euclidean geometry, a thought reinforced by the proposition that
the axioms express fundamental facts of our intuition.  But afterwards you think of a pair
of numbers as a point . . . Here the axioms are made to carry a burden that belongs to
definitions . . . [B]eside the old meaning of the word “axiom”, . . . there emerges another
meaning but one which I cannot grasp.
For Frege, a definition should specify the meaning of a single word whose meaning has not yet
been given, and it should only employ other words whose meanings are already known.  In
contrast, an axiom
. . . must not contain a word or sign whose sense and meaning, or whose contribution to
the expression of a thought, was not already completely laid down, so that there is no
doubt about the sense of the proposition and the thought it expresses.  The only question
can be whether this thought is true and what its truth rests on.  Thus axioms and theorems
can never try to lay down the meaning of a sign or word that occurs in them, but it must
already be laid down.
In sum, Frege’s point is that if the terms in the proposed axioms do not have meaning
beforehand, then the statements cannot be true (or false), and thus they cannot be axioms.  If, on
the other hand, the primitives do have meaning beforehand, then the axioms cannot be
definitions.  Axioms should express truths and definitions should give the meanings and fix the
denotations of certain terms.  Frege argued that with a Hilbert-style implicit definition, neither
job is accomplished.  Hilbert rejected the dilemma.  If the axiomatization is successful, then both
jobs are accomplished at once.
Ironically, the neo-logicist agrees with Hilbert on this issue.  He regards Hume’s
Principle as a meaning-constituting principle that provides a first grasp of the newly-introduced
term “the (cardinal) number of”.  Moreover, the meaning of the newly introduced term is fixed
by stipulation that the statement in which it occurs—Hume’s Principle—is to express a truth. 
Hence for the neo-logicist, as for Hilbert, the two jobs are accomplished at once.  If all goes
well, the statement is an axiom that expresses a truth and a meaning is fixed.
In his reply, dated December 29, Hilbert addressed Frege’s claim that the meanings of
the words “point”, “line”, and “plane” are “not given, but are assumed to be known in advance”:
This is apparently where the cardinal point of the misunderstanding lies.  I do not want to
assume anything as known in advance.  I regard my explanation . . . as the definition of
8the concepts point, line, plane . . . If one is looking for other definitions of a “point”, e.g.
through paraphrase in terms of extensionless, etc., then I must indeed oppose such
attempts in the most decisive way; one is looking for something one can never find
because there is nothing there; and everything gets lost and becomes vague and tangled
and degenerates into a game of hide and seek.
Clearly though, not every proposed axiomatization is a successful implicit definition: 
some are inconsistent; some are not satisfiable.  In these bad cases, no structure is characterized,
and the axioms are not true by stipulation.  So, similarly, we have to ask which are the good or
successful cases of Hilbert-style stipulation, which are the bad cases and, importantly, what are
the criteria that characterize the good ones and the bad ones respectively?  This is the Bad
Company objection.  As with neo-logicism, we ask for criteria for determining when all has gone
well with a stipulation.
For Hilbert the only requirement for the success of a stipulation is that an axiomatization
be “consistent”.  It is not clear, however, whether he was thinking in terms of deductive
consistency or satisfiability at that time, and it may be too much of an anachronism to insist on
the distinction.  To shore up various collections of axioms, Hilbert interprets them in various
systems, often the real numbers.  With hindsight, and a bit of anachronism, we can think of this
as establishing either the satisfiability of the axiomatization, or else its relative deductive
consistency: if real analysis is consistent, then so is the given axiomatization.
From Frege’s perspective, in contrast, there is no need to concern oneself with the
consistency of an axiomatization.  The axioms are supposed to be (self-evident) truths about a
given subject matter.  He noted that from the truth of axioms, “it follows that they do not
contradict one another”.  Hilbert emphatically rejected this more or less traditional perspective:
. . . As long as I have been thinking, writing and lecturing on these things, I have been
saying the exact reverse: if the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other with
all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined by them exist.  This is for
me the criterion of truth and existence.
Hilbert then repeated the role of what we are calling a Hilbert-style implicit definition, noting
that it is impossible to give a definition of “point” in a few lines since “only the whole structure
of axioms yields a complete definition”.  That is, this is the only way to define mathematical
terms.
4Hume’s Principle, understood as a Hilbert-style implicit definition, would be of interest to a
Pythagorean, who believes that All is Number.  More seriously, and for what it is worth, (HP), so
construed, is satisfiable in a domain of size  if and only if there are exactly -many cardinal
numbers (in the sense of ZFC) less than or equal to .  That is, the implicit definition defines a
structure on 0 and on any fixed point in the series of alephs (i.e., any cardinal  such that
=).  If we allow interpretations whose size is not a set, and if global choice holds, then (HP),
so construed, is satisfiable on V (assuming that ZF correctly describes the pure sets).  Notice,
incidentally, that the derivation of the Dedekind-Peano axioms from (HP), what is now called
“Frege’s theorem”, still works when (HP) is understood in this Hilbert-style way.  Frege’s
theorem makes no assumptions, one way or the other, concerning whether there are non-numbers
in the range of the quantifiers.  Thanks to Roy Cook here.
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To be sure, there are important differences between Hilbert-style and neo-logicist
stipulations.  Each non-logical term in a (successful) Hilbert-style implicit definition stands for a
piece—an object, property, function, or relation—of the structure or structures being defined. 
With the exception of the logical terminology (connectives, etc.), no term in a Hilbert-style
implicit definition comes with a previously established meaning or extension.  More importantly,
the quantifiers in a Hilbert-style axiomatization range over (and only over) the places or
concepts in the structure.  Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry, for example, only has
quantifiers that range over “points”, “lines”, and “planes”—the very items whose structure is
being defined.  Let us say that a Hilbert-style implicit definition is self-contained.
This is in stark contrast to typical abstractions.  Recall the form of Hume’s Principle:
(HP)     "F"G(#F=#G   (FG)),
where ‘FG’ is the statement that the F’s are equinumerous with the G’s.  Suppose we (try to)
think of this as a Hilbert-style implicit definition.  Notice, first, that (HP) has only one non-
logical item, the ‘#’ operator that is being defined, and the introduced ontology consists of the
cardinal numbers.  So, if (HP) is understood Hilbert-style, the first-order variables range over,
and only over, cardinal numbers, and the second-order variables range over concepts or
properties (or sets) of cardinal numbers.  So construed, (HP) only allows us to count—assign
cardinalities to—concepts of numbers.4
5Some philosophers and logicians demur from the possibility of unrestricted quantification (see,
for example, Rayo and Uzquiano [2006]).  We need not broach those issues here; one can think
of (HP) as systematically ambiguous.  The point here is that its quantifiers range over arbitrary
objects, not just cardinal numbers.
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Clearly, (HP) is not to be understood in this way.  The point of Scottish neo-logicism is
that one can introduce talk of numbers as a “re-carving” of statements of equinumerosity
concerning any objects whatsoever.  Indeed, this is one of the motivations for logicism itself. 
The observation is that any concept (or at least any finite, sortal concept) has a cardinal number. 
Like logic, arithmetic applies to all subjects.  As long as one is talking about objects at all, one
can count them.  So the opening quantifiers in (HP) are unrestricted.5
The general point here is related to what is sometimes called “Frege’s constraint”, the
thesis that the proper foundation for a mathematical theory should flow from its typical
applications (see Hale [2000] and Wright [2000]).  The logicist and neo-logicist alike argue that
we must start with an account of how arithmetic applies to ordinary situations.  This leads
directly to Hume’s Principle.  To be sure, a theory introduced with a Hilbert-style implicit
definition may find application, but an account of these applications must be tacked on
separately.
There is a further crucial difference between Hilbert-style implicit definitions and neo-
logicist abstractions like (HP).  On this matter, the neo-logicist is closer to Frege.  For Hilbert,
the satisfiability (or relative consistency) of the set of axioms is sufficient for their truth, whereas
for the neo-logicist, a crucial issue is also the uniqueness of the objects referred to by the
relevant terms involved.  At most, Hilbert-style definitions require only that there be sufficient
objects to satisfy the system (whether they be real numbers, beer mugs, or tables and chairs). 
The neo-logicist demands that the resulting expressions function as singular terms and that they
refer to independently existing objects.  As we shall soon see, these differences between the
programs do not prevent both from having Bad Company issues.
6This conclusion depends on interpreting the second-order quantifiers in Hilbert-style implicit
definitions via standard semantics.  We assume, for example, the monadic property variables
range over every collection of objects in the domain.  If the theories are first-order, or second-
order with Henkin semantics, then deductive consistency does suffice for satisfiability, in light of
Gödel’s and Henkin’s completeness theorems.  Neo-logicism also invokes second-order
languages.  The opening quantifiers in Hume’s Principle are second-order, and the embedded
definition of equinumerosity is second-order, since it invokes a quantifier over relations.  The
aforementioned point that certain abstraction principles are satisfiable only on finite domains
also relies on standard semantics.  This matter is a staple in the literature on neo-logicism.  On
the other hand, neo-logicism is perhaps more concerned with deduction than with model-
theoretic satisfiability.  Even so, its derivations rely on impredicative instances of the
comprehension scheme (see Linnebo [2004]).  If we think of the comprehension scheme as
expanding with the linguistic resources, similar points apply.  A sentence analogous to ¬CONPA
is inconsistent with the theory consisting of Hume’s Principle plus a Tarskian truth-predicate,
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4 Bad Company Objection and the epistemic status of the criteria
As noted, it is clear that not every attempt to give a Hilbert-style implicit definition succeeds.  In
particular, a proposed axiomatization may not define anything—there may be nothing that
answers to the axioms.  One obvious way that an axiomatization can fail is if it is inconsistent. 
The Dedekind-Peano axioms, together with a statement that there is a largest prime number,
would be a failed axiomatization.  So was the original presentation of the -calculus.
Deductive consistency is thus necessary for acceptability of a Hilbert-style implicit
definition.  Arguably, it is not sufficient.  Let PA be the conjunction of the second-order
Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic, and let CONPA be a typical arithmetization of the
statement that PA is consistent.  Kurt Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem entails that PA
together with ¬CONPA is consistent.  But this “theory” has no models:  PA is categorical, in that
all of its models are isomorphic to the natural numbers and CONPA is true on the natural numbers
(presumably) and thus in all models of PA.  So PA together with ¬CONPA is not satisfiable.  So
any attempt to stipulate PA+¬CONPA as a Hilbert-style implicit definition would fail just about
as badly as an attempt to stipulate PA and the statement that there is a largest prime number, or,
for that matter, an attempt to stipulate PA+¬PA.  One can, of course, do deductions from these
various premises, but there is no reason to think that any consequence of these stipulations is true
of the natural numbers, or of anything else for that matter.6
and with a sufficiently rich theory of natural numbers and sets of natural numbers.  Moreover,
much of the model theory can be recaptured from within.  See Shapiro [1991].  Nevertheless,
some of the points below do not turn on whether the semantics is standard. 
7Coherence is loosely modeled by the mathematical notion of satisfiability.  Recall that as the
notion is defined, a set of sentences is satisfiable if and only if there is a set that satisfies it. 
There are two potential problems.  First, there might be axiomatizations that are true if
interpreted on a proper class, like V, but not on any set.  In this case, the mathematical notion of
satisfiability may not coincide with the one relevant to Hilbert-style implicit definitions.  This
won’t be problematic if a certain reflection principle holds, yielding the existence of so-called
small large cardinals (see Shapiro [1987], [1991, Chapter 6, §6.3]).  More importantly, the
mathematical notion of satisfiability presupposes a theory of sets (or classes), together with an
account of how a given axiomatization is satisfied in a given set (or class).  Do we obtain that
theory with a Hilbert-style implicit definition?  Does the latter have to be satisfiable as well?  In
what?  Regress threatens—depending on how one construes the foundational issues.  We return
to this issue in the final section.
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Of course, it won’t help much to lay down a principle that a Hilbert-style stipulation is
acceptable only if the axiomatization is satisfiable, in some intuitive sense.  This is just to say
that a stipulation is acceptable only if there is a structure it characterizes.  We were wondering
just which stipulations characterize structures.
Shapiro [1997] introduces a new primitive, called “coherence”, and states that an implicit
definition defines a structure if (and only if) it is coherent.  It is not possible to give a non-trivial
mathematical definition of coherence, but perhaps we can say enough about it to convey the
idea.7  Or perhaps not.  We need not engage that issue here.  Clearly however, there are some
conditions which an acceptable Hilbert-style implicit definition must meet.  Call these conditions
CH.  The idea is that an axiomatization is successful—defines at least one structure—only if it
meets CH.  We need not speculate on the details of these conditions here, except to insist that
consistency is among them.
We extend the same courtesy to the neo-logicist.  It is clear that any acceptable
abstraction principle must be consistent, and, as above, it is also clear that consistency is not
sufficient for acceptability.  As noted, there are consistent abstractions that are satisfiable only
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on finite universes (see note 6).  Such an abstraction is incompatible with Hume’s Principle. 
There is an abstraction that is satisfiable only on limits in the series of inaccessibles and there is
an abstraction that is satisfiable only on successors in the series of inaccessibles (see Weir
[2003]).  Each of these is consistent and, indeed, satisfiable if there are enough inaccessible
cardinals, and yet the two abstractions cannot both be acceptable—they are not jointly
satisfiable.  Over the years, neo-logicists have developed a number of criteria on successful
abstractions:  consistency, conservativeness, etc.  The details are not under scrutiny here.  We
just note that there are conditions CF on acceptable abstractions.  The idea is that an abstraction
is successful—introduces a type of abstract and is true of said abstracts—only if it meets CF.  We
only insist that consistency is among these conditions.  The conditions CF and CH may be the
same or they may be different.  We do not care.
5 Epistemic status of the CH and CF
Suppose that a mathematician, call her Emma, attempts a Hilbert-style implicit definition.  And
suppose that Wright’s character Hero attempts a neo-logicist abstraction.  Again, Emma’s
stipulation succeeds only if CH is met and Hero’s stipulation succeeds only if CF is met.  Our
central question here concerns the epistemic status of the conditions CH and CF. What does
Emma or Hero have to know or at least be justified in believing about CH or CF, respectively,
before they can be credited with knowledge of the stipulated statement?  We explore several
options below, but find none satisfactory, at least when it comes to the epistemological goals of
neo-logicism.
5.1 Ya really gotta know.
The first and perhaps most natural option is a requirement that Emma (or Hero) must be in a
position to show that the conditions CH (or CF) are met in order to be credited with knowledge of
the implicit definition in question.
This requirement on knowledge is a broadly internalist one.  Within epistemology, access
internalism is the view that for a subject to know a proposition p, she has to be in a position to
8 For a helpful survey of the debate and different characterisations of internalism and
externalism, see Pappas [2005] or Pryor [2001].  Our characterization is a simplification of
Pappas’s characterization of access internalism.  The use of other, more sophisticated versions of
internalism may complicate the present point, but we must leave that discussion for another
occasion.
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access the knowledge-conferring justification for p by a priori reasoning or self-knowledge.8  To
be sure, in this paper we do not attempt a philosophical analysis of the concept of knowledge,
nor even the compound concept of mathematical knowledge.  Rather, we aim to investigate how
certain requirements for knowledge, if construed in a broadly internalist way, may be
incompatible with certain foundationalist approaches to mathematical knowledge.
It does seem intuitive, at least at first, to think that the holding of the conditions CH (or
CF) is at least part of the knowledge-conferring justification that a stipulation supposedly
confers.  Arguably, in mathematics the standard for knowledge is proof, especially since the
conditions in question here (CH, CF) are not always obvious or self-evident.  This suggests that
Emma and Hero have to be in a position to prove that the conditions for the implicit definitions
in question are met in order to know it.  Thus our first option.
Something like this may underlie Hilbert’s Grundlagen [1899].  As noted above, he
typically supports an axiomatization by showing how to interpret the primitive terms in such a
way that the axioms are true.  The interpretation is usually in the real numbers.  So perhaps we
can read Hilbert as taking on the burden of justifying his implicit definitions.  If so, then perhaps
there is such a burden.  The present option is to set the burden high:  a theorist must be able to
prove (or maybe cite a proof) that CH or CF are met as part what it takes for a successful implicit
definition.
However, at least some of the items in the conditions CH and CF are themselves
mathematical.  The mathematical notion of satisfiability presupposes a background theory of sets
or interpretations, but perhaps satisfiability, in this form, is not part of CH or CF.  Still, we saw,
or at least assumed, that consistency is among the conditions.  Hilbert himself came to
understand that deductive consistency is itself a mathematical matter.  It invokes a theory of
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syntax:  sentences, definitions, rules, and deductions.  How is this meta-theory to be established? 
Is the ontology of sentences, deductions, and so forth to be introduced via a neo-logicist or
Hilbert-style implicit definition?  If so, how is this implicit definition to be established?  Does
Emma or Hero have to show that the meta-theory, too, meets CH or CF, respectively?  How is it
possible for either of them to do that?  What is the meta-meta-theory?
In addition to this potential regress, we encounter a vicious circularity with the more
basic mathematical theories.  Formulas in a rigorous deductive system are, in a sense,
structurally similar to natural numbers, and deductive consistency corresponds to an arithmetic
property of collections of natural numbers.  More formally, arithmetic and the theory of syntax
are definitionally equivalent (see, for example, Corcoran et al. [1974]).  The structuralist
concludes that the theory of syntax just is arithmetic, or all but arithmetic, but we need not insist
on that much here.  Whatever we say about the Hilbertian, the neo-logicist surely is not a
structuralist.  The point here is that the tight structural connection between numbers and strings
indicates that, at least prima facie, the two theories are, in the relevant sense, equally problematic
(or unproblematic).   Neither theory has an epistemic foundational advantage over the other.
Again, the neo-logicist holds that the natural numbers are, or at least can be, introduced
via the stipulation of (HP).  The Hilbertian holds that the natural numbers can be introduced by
the Dedekind-Peano axioms.  If we insist on the present internalist approach—that a subject has
to be in a position to show that the conditions CH or CF are met for the relevant axioms in
question—then before we can hold that either of these is a successful implicit definition of the
natural numbers, the stipulater, Emma or Hero, has to be in a position to show that the
abstraction or axiomatization is consistent.  But he or she cannot do that without having on board
a theory that is equivalent to—and equi-consistent with—arithmetic.
The later Hilbert program suggested a resolution to this circularity and regress, or it
would have if Hilbert were still thinking in terms of implicit definitions in the 1920’s and Gödel
had not intervened.  The idea is that questions of deductive consistency are to be settled in
finitary arithmetic, and, crucially, finitary arithmetic is not to be understood as introduced via an
implicit definition.  Rather, it is founded on something like Kantian intuition, or perhaps better,
finitary arithmetic simply needs no foundation.  It is not that one cannot raise epistemological
9As is often noted, we cannot be definitive here, since there is no consensus on what finitary
arithmetic is supposed to be.  See Detlefsen [1986].  We also have not ruled out the possibility
that the stipulater can acquire the relevant mathematical knowledge (that the condition CF or CH
is met) by means short of proof.  Unless CF or CH happens to be self-evident—whatever that
means—it is not clear how this knowledge is to be acquired.
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issues about this branch of knowledge, but there simply is no more secure standpoint from which
to resolve such questions.  If one somehow comes to doubt finitary arithmetic, it is not clear that
she can go on to think about anything at all (see Tait [1981]).  We thus take finitary arithmetic
for granted, and use that theory to discharge the burden of justifying other, more powerful and
more contentious mathematical theories—full Dedekind-Peano arithmetic, real analysis, set
theory, etc.
But, of course, this was not to be.  The structural connections between the arithmetic of
the natural numbers and syntactical properties of well-formed-formulas, such as consistency,
was tightened and exploited in Gödel’s celebrated incompleteness theorems, and subsequent
work in meta-mathematics.  It is not possible to prove the consistency of, say, real analysis in
real analysis, much less in a weaker and safer theory, one that does not need a foundation.  A
fortiori, since consistency is among the conditions on both Hilbert-style and neo-logicist implicit
definitions, and provided that the target theory T is sufficiently rich, it is not possible to
discharge the burden and establish CH or CF in T, much less in finitary arithmetic, or some other
theory that needs no justification.9
In sum, it is surely too much to demand that Hero has to be able to prove that HP is
consistent in order to be able to put it forward as a knowledge-grounding implicit definition, and
it is too much to demand that Emma be able to prove that Dedekind-Peano arithmetic is
consistent so that she can stipulate its axioms successfully.  We take it that, thanks to Gödel, this
(admittedly simple-minded) internalist option is a non-starter.  We somehow have to lower the
bar.  The trick is to do so while leave some semblance of a foundationalist program in place.
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5.2 If it’s good, then it’s good.
Our second option is the opposite of the first.  The thesis to be explored now is that the
stipulating theorist has no substantial epistemic burden.  If a Hilbert-style implicit definition
meets CH, then any stipulation of it is successful.  According to this option, if CH is in fact met,
then the axiomatization defines a structure (or structures), and the stipulater, Emma, can be
credited with knowing that the axiomatization is true of this structure (or these structures). 
Similarly, suppose that Hero puts forward an abstraction principle, like HP.  On our second
option, the only requirement is that the abstraction principle in fact meets CF.  If it does, then the
requisite abstracts have been successfully introduced, and Hero knows that the abstraction
principle is true of them.
Our second option thus has the theorist confront Bad Company-type worries and stare
them down, at least so far as the epistemological burdens go.  On this option, if the relevant
conditions CH or CF are met then the implicit definitions are true and knowledge-grounding.  The
bad, or failed axiomatizations are rejected just because they do not satisfy the requisite
conditions, CH or CF respectively.
This is not to say that there is no epistemic role for relative consistency proofs and the
like.  It is not as if Hilbert wasted his time in providing them.  In showing that Euclidean
geometry can be interpreted in real analysis, the theorist learns that if real analysis is acceptable
then so is Euclidean geometry.  So she does not have to worry about the latter, unless she is
worried about the former.  If a question is actually raised about the acceptability of the
axiomatization, the theorist has something to say.  On the present option, however, the theorist
needs no such assurance to push on.  She can take the risk, and live dangerously.  We have
known since Gödel that we have to fly without a safety net.  If all is in fact well anyway—if CH
is met—then the stipulating theorist knows that the stipulated sentences (axioms or abstraction)
are true of the defined subject matter.  The same goes for the neo-logicist.
Our first option, just rejected, invoked an analogy with internalist epistemology.  Here
we make a comparison with externalism.  According to some accounts, if a belief is produced by
a reliable mechanism, such as ordinary vision, then it is justified.  The subject need not have an
accessible warrant that the mechanism in question is reliable.  It is not that there is no point in
10These assumptions are implicit in much of the literature on the Bad Company objection.  The
proposed conditions on good abstraction principles—stability, irenicity, and the like—are often
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verifying this reliability (to the extent that this is possible).  For example, the subject can consult
an optometrist to deal with questions about the reliability of his eyes.  The externalist thesis is
that the subject need not be able to verify the reliability in order to be justified.  Analogously, on
our second option here, Emma need not be able to verify that CH holds, and Hero need not verify
that CF holds, in order for each to be successful in their stipulations.  By hypothesis, the
stipulation in question is successful if and only if CH or CF holds.
Again, this paper is not an exercise in epistemology, and we do not attempt detailed
views on the nature of mathematical knowledge.  Rather, we aim to investigate how certain
requirements for knowledge, now if they are broadly externally construed, may be incompatible
with certain foundational approaches to mathematical knowledge.  For simplicity, we use this
rather simple version of externalism, and do not supply many details, in order to raise the general
concern.  As commonly understood, the externalist insists that a subject need not have an
internally available warrant that the conditions for knowledge are met in order to be credited
with knowledge.  Analogously, here we do not insist that our stipulater be in a position to show
that the relevant condition, CH or CF, is met, in order to be credited with knowledge of a
stipulated implicit definition.
It is often argued, or claimed, that internalist epistemology leads to skepticism:  if the bar
is set that high, then there simply is no knowledge, or at least no non-trivial knowledge of
ordinary things.  In the previous sub-section, we have argued that something like this is indeed
the case on an internalist construal of the conditions on successful implicit definition.  We argue
here that the second option sets too low of a standard.  It makes mathematical knowledge come
too easy.
We cannot be completely definitive here without speculating on the details of CH or CF. 
Assume, for the time being, that if an axiomatization is satisfiable, then it meets CH, and assume
that if an abstraction principle is satisfiable, then it meets CF.  Alternately, we can assume any
axiomatization that is logically equivalent to a good one is itself good.10  We take it for granted,
stated in model-theoretic terms.  If the conditions are understood this way, then they do not
distinguish between two abstraction principles that have the same models.  Thanks to Roy Cook
for pointing this out.
11We assume here that the axiomatizations and stipulations are to be understood as second-order
with standard semantics.  One can get the same results if we think of the comprehension scheme
as extending to include formulas in other languages, as in note 6 above.  If the axiomatizations or
neo-logicist stipulations are interpreted with Henkin semantics (or if they are first-order), then
one can make similar points if the example Q is a deductive consequence of PA, although the
arguments will be a bit different.
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at least for the sake of this argument, that the Dedekind-Peano axiomatization PA meets CH, and
that Hume’s Principle HP meets CF.  Otherwise, there is no point to the indicated programs.
Let Q be any true statement in the language of arithmetic.  To make things definite, let Q
be the statement of Fermat’s last theorem, and suppose that we go back to the period before this
result was known.  Suppose that Emma, tired of searching for a proof, simply stipulates PA&Q
as a Hilbert-style implicit definition.  Under the prevailing assumptions, PA&Q meets CH. 
Indeed, PA&Q is satisfiable:  second-order PA has only one model, up to isomorphism, and by
assumption Q is true in that model.11  Moreover, PA&Q is logically equivalent to PA—it has the
same models.  So, under the current, simple-minded externalist option, Emma’s stipulation is
successful: it defines a structure, and she knows that PA&Q is true of that structure.
It is worse.  Since she knows the relevant logic, Emma knows that all models of PA&Q
are isomorphic to the natural numbers.  And she knows that isomorphic structures are equivalent. 
By using the comprehension scheme and the induction axioms in PA and PA&Q, something like
this can be established internally (i.e., without explicit reference to model theory), in ordinary
second-order deductive systems.  Under the present assumptions, Emma knows that there is a
structure defined by PA&Q, and, of course, Q holds in every such structure.  So Emma knows
that Q holds of the natural numbers, the intended model of PA.  What did we need the Wiles’
proof for?
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Bertrand Russell [1993, 71] once wrote that the “method of ‘postulating’ what we want
has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil.”  Surely, that
is the proper conclusion to draw for Hilbert-style implicit definitions, on our second, loose
option.  There must be some epistemic burden on anyone who attempts to put forward a Hilbert-
style implicit definition.  Demanding that the stipulater provide a proof of consistency is perhaps
too much, but not demanding anything of him—beyond the mere fact that the conditions are
satisfied—is surely too little.
Essentially the same goes for neo-logicism, on our second, externalist option for Bad
Company.  To be sure, the neo-logicist need not envisage someone trying to stipulate HP&Q, as
an implicit definition, since this formula is not an abstraction principle.  Hume’s Principle has
the proper form (ABS), but HP&Q does not.  But we can modify a technique from Richard Heck
[1992] to do the trick.
Without loss of generality, assume that the only non-logical terminology in the language
of arithmetic are the symbols for zero and the successor function.  Let  be a sentence in this
language that does not contain any occurrences of the variables x, f, and X.  Let [X,f,x] be the
result of replacing each occurrence of the symbol for zero with x, replacing each occurrence of
the successor symbol with f, and then restricting the quantifiers to X.  So, for example,
(¬"y(sy=0))[X,f,x] is (¬"y(Xy  fy=x)).  As above, let Q be any sentence in the language of
arithmetic that is true but unknown at the given time.  Let Q* be the sentence:
"X"f"x(PA[X,f,x]  Q[X,f,x]).
In effect, Q* says that Q holds in all structures that satisfy PA, but without explicit
mention of models and the like.  Given the categoricity of PA, this amounts to a statement that Q
holds in all structures isomorphic to the natural numbers.  Notice that Q* has no non-logical
terminology.  Moreover, Q* is logically true if and only if Q is true of the natural numbers (see
Shapiro [1991, Chapter 4, Corollary 4.9]).
Now suppose that Hero attempts to stipulate the following abstraction principle:
(HP+Q):     "F"G((F)=(G)   [FG & (¬Q*  "x(Fx  Gx))]),
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where ‘FG’ is the usual statement that the F’s are equinumerous with the G’s.  Notice that like
(HP) and Basic Law V, (HP+Q) is a logical abstraction, in that it has no non-logical terminology
on its right-hand side.  It says that two concepts have the same abstract—the same —just in
case they are equinumerous and, if ¬Q*, they are co-extensive.
By hypothesis, Q is true of the natural numbers.  It follows that (HP+Q) has the same
models as (HP).  Indeed, suppose that (HP) is true in a given structure (or in the universe).  Then,
by Frege’s theorem, there is a sub-structure that satisfies PA, namely the structure of the defined
cardinal numbers.  By hypothesis, Q is true in that structure, and so Q* is also true.  It follows
that (HP+Q) is true if we interpret (F) as the cardinal number of F.  Conversely, suppose that
(HP+Q) is true in a given structure (or in the universe).  It follows, by an argument similar to that
leading to Russell’s paradox, that ¬Q* is false in the structure (or in the universe).  So
"F"G((F)=(G)  FG) is true in the structure (or in the universe).  It thus easily follows that
(HP) is satisfiable in that same structure (or in the universe): just interpret the cardinal number
operator as .  In other words, (HP) and (HP+Q) have the same models.
Under the prevailing assumptions, then, (HP+Q) satisfies CF—assuming, of course, that
(HP) does.  So according to our present externalist option, Hero successfully stipulates (HP+Q),
and thereby comes to know that (HP+Q) is true of the introduced abstracts—the ’s.  But Hero
can then also deduce, via an argument much like Frege’s theorem (combined with techniques
associated with Dedekind) that the finite ’s are isomorphic to the finite cardinal numbers
introduced by (HP), and he knows that isomorphic structures are equivalent.  Since Hero also
knows Q*, he thereby knows that Q holds of the natural numbers.  Thus, as with Hilbert-style
implicit definitions, the neo-logicist bypasses all the hard and ingenious work that Wiles did in
establishing Fermat’s last theorem.  Here, too, we have theft over honest toil.
Our second, externalist option did not start life as the thesis that every arithmetic truth is
known, or can easily become known, nor as the thesis that every true belief is knowledge.  The
present option is just a loose thesis about the requirements on successful stipulation, either
Hilbert-style or neo-logicist.  But the option leads to an absurd view much like this. 
Mathematical knowledge comes too easy.  In particular, the key role of proofs as extending
12To continue the analogy with externalism, an advocate of this loose option might try to make
the view more palatable by insisting on a distinction between Hero or Emma knowing an
implicit definition p and Hero or Emma being able to responsibly claim knowledge of p.  Or
perhaps our advocate will concede that, say, Emma does know PA+Q and that Hero knows
HP+Q, but that neither knows that he or she knows the statement in question.  It seems to us that
the conclusions are still bad enough; the view is still plenty unpalatable.  But the underlying
issues here would take us too far afield.
13Agustín Rayo [2003] explores and criticizes this option for other reasons than we do here.  He
presents a holistic resolution which is, in some respects, similar to the account developed in the
closing section of this paper.
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knowledge is undermined since we can always conjoin a true belief to the axioms and take this
new statement to be known.12
This worry could be met if one could give an account of which propositions are eligible
to be axioms and which should be (non-trivial) theorems—assuming that these do not
substantially overlap.  Our challenge is that on the Hilbert account no such distinction can be
drawn—at least not on the basis of the form of the implicit definition. Also, due to Heck’s
technique, no such distinction can be drawn in the case of abstraction principles and least not on
the basis of the form of an abstraction principle.
5.3 Presumption of innocence.
One way to back off, slightly, from the pure externalist position would be to declare that a
proposed Hilbert style implicit definition or neo-logicist abstraction is acceptable, and known to
be true, provided only that (1) the relevant conditions, CH or CF, hold and that (2) the theorist
sees that he or she has no good reason to think otherwise.  Thus, for example, Hero knows that
Hume’s Principle is true and Emma knows that the axiomatization of arithmetic is true because
there is no particular reason to think that the conditions are not met.  The only burden on them is
to make sure that the usual arguments to paradox are blocked, and that nothing else fishy is
going on.  The idea here is that the default position is that an implicit definition is good.13  This
sketch of the third way will suffice to highlight our concerns with it
14Wright’s [1997] second conservativeness requirement on good abstractions is that if a
conclusion  is derived via disjunctive syllogism from a known paradox, then  has to be
shown to be true independently of that demonstration.  That is exactly the problem here:  Q is
not known independently of the derivation from the disjunctive abstraction principle.
15Of course, if Q is itself a deductive consequence of PA, then PA itself is such an
axiomatization.  We have in mind here an axiomatization that is significantly different from PA
and from PA&Q, so that the deduction of Q from the axiomatization strikes one as theft over
honest toil.  Admittedly, we have no way of making this precise.
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Once again, let PA be the conjunction of the second-order Dedekind-Peano axioms, and
let Q be a true but presently unknown statement in the language of arithmetic.  Suppose that
Emma attempts to stipulate PA&Q as a Hilbert-style implicit definition.  On the present option,
she should be skeptical.  She can see that PA&Q is satisfiable if and only if Q is true of the
natural numbers, and, by hypothesis, she has no idea whether that is so or not.  So she sees that
something is fishy, and thus has to retract the stipulation.  It is not good after all, at least not yet.
Similarly, just above, we had Hero propose the following abstraction principle:
(HP+Q):     "F"G((F)=(G)   [FG & (¬Q*  "x(Fx  Gx))]),
Being a competent logician, who is familiar with Russell’s paradox, Hero should be able to see
that (HP+Q) is satisfiable if and only if Q is true of the natural numbers.  And, again, he has no
idea whether that is so.  So something is fishy here, too, and the default position is defeated.14
On both of these counts, however, the conclusion that something is fishy and thus that the
stipulation is defeated turns on an artifact of the way the stipulations were set up in the last sub-
section.  Suppose Emma stumbles onto a more complex axiomatization E that, as it happens, is
(deductively) equivalent to PA+Q, but she has no idea of this equivalence,15 and sees no reason
to think that the axiomatization might fail to meet the condition CH.  So the default is
maintained, and the axiomatization E is good.  Emma knows that it is true.  Suppose that the
mathematical community at large accepts this.  Similarly, Hero can stumble onto a complex
abstraction H that, as it happens, is equivalent to HP+Q, but does not have the straightforward
disjunctive form, and there is no reason to think that Q or Basic Law V plays any role in it. 
16A referee suggested this outcome.
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Then, according to the proposal of this section, the stipulation of H is good, by default.  Again,
suppose the mathematical community at large accepts it, and starts working in this field,
publishing articles about it in major journals, and the like.
Suppose that some time later, a brilliant mathematician discovers how to model the
natural numbers in the ontology of E or in the abstracts generated by H.  A bit later, someone
else derives Q from E and/or H.  They are then in position to conclude that Q is true of the
natural numbers.  By the plan of this section—presumption of innocence—Q is now known to be
a truth of arithmetic.  We take this scenario as a reductio ad absurdum of the intermediate
proposal at hand.  It is not as if the community has done no honest toil, as happened with pure
externalism, but the toil is not of the right kind to establish a truth of arithmetic.
It is possible, we suppose, that the community would regard, and perhaps should regard,
these results as belated discoveries that something fishy is going on, after all.  That is, the
discovery that the new theory yields a “proof” that Q holds in the natural numbers amounts to a
defeater for the stipulation.16  Perhaps, but the situation could also be taken as a proof of Q.  It
might depend on how confident they are in the new theory, and on the role it takes in the
community.
Part of the problem here is that the notion of “nothing fishy is going on” is too obscure to
characterize a serious position, at least as it stands.  Surely, it is the burden of the proponent of
this general idea to clarify the conditions for when the subject can assume that “nothing fishy is
going on” and so assume the default success of an implicit definition.  We turn to one such
proposal.
5.4 Entitlements: a recent proposal
In [2004], Wright is mainly concerned with external-world skepticism, and he uses a specific
type of warrant, so-called “entitlements”, to respond to such skepticism.  He notes that the same
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idea can also be used for the project of acquiring mathematical or logical knowledge, and thus it
may help with the present problem.
Wright’s program begins with the observation that in pursuing any type of cognitive
project—perceiving the world, learning about the past, acquiring mathematical knowledge,
etc.—a subject needs to make specific presuppositions.  For example, when someone undertakes
a project of finding a phone number in the directory, he needs to take the reliability of his senses
for granted.  In this case, the presupposition can be challenged, and our subject can get his eyes
tested in response to such a challenge.  However, this further investigation would in turn also
raise its own presuppositions which are of a similar type.  The optometrist can get her equipment
checked, and have her own eyes checked, but these would involve further presuppositions.  In
practice the regress ends.  It has to.  Wright’s [2004, 189] point is that “whenever any cognitive
achievement takes place, it does so in a context of specific presuppositions, which are not
themselves an expression of any cognitive achievement to date”.
As a result, there is an element of adventure in any cognitive achievement.  It is not just
mathematics that has to fly without a safety net.  In any cognitive project, there will be certain
presuppositions that have not been subject to a cognitive investigation and have to be assumed
on trust, i.e. without evidential justification. Wright introduces the notion of entitlement to
capture the idea that at least in many cases, it is not irrational or unwarranted to invest trust in a
presupposition.  In typical cases, the trust is rational.  He writes:
Let me try to harness these ideas to a definite proposal about entitlement.  First (to tidy
up a bit) a definition:  let us say that P is a presupposition of a particular cognitive project
if to doubt P (in advance) would rationally commit one to doubting the significance or
competence of the project.
Then the relevant kind of entitlement—an entitlement of cognitive project—may be
proposed to be any presupposition of a cognitive project meeting the following additional
two conditions: 
i. We have no sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue and 
ii. The attempt to justify P would involve further presuppositions in turn of no
more secure a prior standing, . . . , and so on without limit; so that someone
pursuing the relevant enquiry who accepted that there is nevertheless an onus to
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justify P would implicitly undertake a commitment to an infinite regress of
justificatory projects, each concerned to vindicate the presupposition of its
predecessor.  (Wright [2004, 190])
So, the idea is that whenever we need to carry out a specific cognitive project whose
presuppositions fulfil the first and second requirement stated, then “we should—are rationally
entitled to—just go ahead and trust that the [presuppositions] are met” (Wright [2004,190-1]). 
This idea resonates, in parts, the underlying thought of the presumption of innocence, that one
can take the success of a definition as a default provided that there seems nothing wrong with it,
i.e., that it fulfills condition (i).  What is added here is that any attempt to justify the
presupposition in question would lead to a hopeless regress.
Let us now consider if and how this proposal could apply to the cognitive project of
accumulating mathematical knowledge by means of Hilbert-style or neo-logicist stipulations. 
Clearly, it is a presupposition of this cognitive project that the conditions CH or CF are met.  As
noted before, consistency is among both conditions.  Indeed, to doubt the consistency of Hume’s
Principle, for example, would rationally commit someone to doubting the significance of the
entire neo-logicist cognitive project (pace dialetheism), or at least this instance of it.  And
clearly, to doubt the consistency of the Dedekind-Peano axioms would call into question the
project of stipulating it (again, dialetheism notwithstanding).
Does this particular presupposition—the consistency of Hume’s Principle and the
Dedekind-Peano axioms—fulfil Wright’s two conditions to qualify as an entitlement?  Consider
the second condition first, and let us focus on Hume’s Principle.  The issue is whether an attempt
to justify the claim that this abstraction is consistent would involve further presuppositions
which are of no more secure a prior standing.
In light of the incompleteness theorem, it seems that the only foreseeable means to show
that Hume’s Principle is consistent is to provide a relative consistency proof—relative to another
mathematical system, or relative to the soundness of the system used in the proof.  This system
again incurs the same presupposition, namely that it is consistent.  As a result, it is reasonable to
suppose that an enquiry to justify this presupposition would itself “involve further
presuppositions in turn of no more secure a prior standing, . . . , and so on without limit”.  And
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thereby one would “implicitly undertake a commitment to an infinite regress of justificatory
projects, each concerned to vindicate the presupposition of its predecessor.”  So, it seems,
Wright’s second condition can be regarded as fulfilled.
The first condition is trickier.  It aims to capture in more sophisticated philosophical
terminology the idea, noted earlier, that “nothing fishy is going on”.  Yet, it seems to us the first
conditions is still unclear in important respects.  First, “having no (sufficient) reason” should
not—at least on our understanding—be understood “externally” in the sense of “there being no
(sufficient) reason”.  To explain, if Hume’s Principle is in fact consistent, there would be no
(sufficient) reason to doubt it—in the “realm of reason” as it were.  However, this should not
automatically mean that a subject has no (sufficient) reason to doubt it.  Otherwise we are back
on the externalist-type lines of two sub-sections back, and condition (i) does not do much work
in relation to the thinking subject.
So we should look for an understanding of “having no sufficient reason” along more
internalist lines.  Once again, demanding a proof that all is well is asking for too much.  Even so,
the thinker, Hero or Emma, has a genuine epistemic responsibility, and the condition is relative
to the information-state of the subject.  Take as a proposal the following:
Once all available evidence (in a very broad sense) which might show that a
presupposition P is untrue has been surveyed, and it is established that it does not
undermine P, then the subject has no sufficient reason to believe P is untrue.
In the spirit of Wright’s proposal, the key idea here is that the notion of “available evidence” is
confined to what can be reasonably expected from an epistemic subject.
Let us return to the consistency of Hume’s Principle as a presupposition and see how it
complies to condition (i) for entitlements, as articulated thus far.  Do we have sufficient reason
to believe this presupposition to be untrue?  Well, there is the Bad Company objection.  In
particular, there are inconsistent principles looking rather similar to Hume’s Principle.  So, in
order to nullify any sufficient reason to believe that Hume’s Principle is inconsistent, we need to
look at all the available evidence which would defeat the presupposition. This means we need to
look at whether known types of paradoxes can be developed from Hume’s Principle.  Once we
have surveyed all the “usual suspects”, Russell’s and Burali-Forti’s constructions for example,
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and all other evidence we can think of, which might show that the presupposition of consistency
is not met, and we see that Hume’s Principle is not subject to any of them, then we can consider
the first condition to be fulfilled.  In these circumstances there is “no sufficient reason to believe
Hume’s Principle is consistent to be untrue”.  Although this is a mere sketch, it does promise to
be an alternative to the pure and strict internalist and the pure and loose externalist responses
rejected above.
Nevertheless, we still run into variants of the problems highlighted in the previous sub-
section.  To continue our main example, suppose that Hero stumbles across a complex
abstraction principle A that is deductively equivalent to HP+Q but he has no idea of this
equivalence and he sees no reason to believe that any of the known paradoxes might apply to the
principles.  Any attempt to generate a Russell or Burali-Forti paradox on the defined abstracts
fails.  So, on the present proposal, Hero can be considered to have no sufficient reason to believe
the principle to be untrue and thereby (assuming condition (ii) is fulfilled) acquire an entitlement
for the statement in question.  This yields cheap knowledge that Q is true of the natural numbers.
This type of ignorance about the content of foundational principles is ubiquitous within
mathematical practice.  Connections between axiomatizations are discovered all the time.  If the
entitlement approach is to apply to these cases, then it is open to the problem that far too many
statements that intuitively seem ineligible to be an entitlement, say because they are complex or
not sufficiently foundational, turn out to be so.
There is an additional worry that with the entitlement approach, the more “ignorant” a
subject is, the easier it will be to satisfy the above condition.  That is, an uneducated stipulater
will not know of many defeaters and so it will be easier for this subject to establish that there is
no sufficient reason to believe P is untrue.  The fewer “usual subjects” the subject—or her
community—is aware of, the less work she has to do to maintain the entitlement.
These are some of the many issues that the entitlement theorist has to resolve to make his
view viable.  Here, we mainly note that many problems seem to affect such a position that
attempts to locate itself somewhere between a pure externalist and a pure internalist approach.
17For further critical discussion of the entitlement approach applied to mathematics, see Ebert
[ms], Pedersen [2005] and Pedersen [ms].
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This is not to say that it fails rather that more work needs to be done to consider it a genuine
alternative.17
6 Holism:  an unFregean move.
There is another general problem in the vicinity of the entitlement, or presumption of innocence
proposals, no matter how they are articulated further.  In effect, Wright’s proposal adopts
provisos of some kind concerning potential defeaters.  If conditions (i) and (ii) are met
concerning certain proposed foundational stipulations, then the stipulater can trust that the
stipulations are successful and thus true.  This invites our running question concerning the
epistemic status of the provisos, a sort of ugliness issue one level up.  Does the stipulating
subject have to know that conditions (i) and (ii) are met, or does he have to have some reason to
think that they are met, or does it just have to be the case that conditions are met?  The latter
option, leads us back into the externalist direction broached above, and fails to be suitable for the
foundationalist approach, as above.  The former options raise important questions about what
exactly the subject has to know about the provisos, and so a further epicycle is about to be
started.  Is the subject entitled to the thesis that there are no defeaters, and that any attempt to
investigate the consistency, say, of the stipulation would lead to a regress?
Consider the second condition, that the “attempt to justify” the presuppositions “would
involve further presuppositions in turn of no more secure a prior standing, . . . , and so on
without limit”.  We noted above this condition is plausibly met in the cases of Hume’s Principle
and PA.  Presumably, the subject has to know, or have good reason to believe, that any attempt
to certify the consistency of Hume’s Principle, for example, would involve a presupposition no
more secure.  It seems to us that the only way to show this would be to give a relative
consistency proof.
18Hale and Wright [2001, Introduction] provide some discussion of the role of meta-theory in
neo-logicism.
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In the original articulation of Scottish neo-logicism, Wright [1983] conjectured that HP
(which was then called N=) is consistent.  Boolos [1987] showed that HP is equi-consistent with
second order Peano arithmetic, the system we have been calling PA (see also Parsons [1964] and
Hodes [1984]).  Since no one (or hardly anyone) seriously doubts the consistency of second-
order Peano arithmetic, no one (or hardly anyone) seriously doubts the consistency of HP. 
Boolos’s result provided some sort of legitimization for Scottish neo-logicism, and it made the
program more respectable, or so it seems.
However, we are puzzled as the point, or value, of the equi-consistency result from the
perspective of the neo-logicist himself.  How does the equi-consistency bear on what Hero
knows, or what he can take himself to know?  Recall that the thesis of neo-logicism is that Hero
acquires knowledge of arithmetic by stipulating HP.  From this epistemological perspective, one
would think that there should be no epistemological payoff in providing relative consistency
proofs.  It is not just that such proofs cannot offer any kind of guarantee that HP is in good order. 
That much is not on the agenda anyway—thanks to Gödel.  Our question here is how the relative
consistency proofs can even help—how they can assure Hero that Wright’s condition (ii) is met. 
From the foundational perspective, an appeal to another mathematical theory is simply not
available.  And it would seem disingenuous to appeal to another axiomatization of arithmetic.
In the previous section, we claimed that Wright’s condition (ii) is met for HP and PA. 
The argument appealed to the second incompleteness theorem, which is itself a piece of
mathematics.  In effect, the incompleteness theorems are proved in formal systems at least as
strong as arithmetic.  It is hard to see how Hero can appeal to them, until arithmetic is
established.
In the end, this problem may or may not be resolved to the satisfaction of the neo-
logicist.18  To close this article, we briefly propose another reaction to ugliness issues like this.  It
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is a perspective on implicit definitions and stipulations that is at odds with the foundationalist
aspects of neo-logicism.
According to Michael Hallett [1990], Hilbert’s view, at the time of the publication of his
Grundlagen and the correspondence with Frege, was that if an axiomatization accords with
mathematics as developed thus far, then one can conclude that the axiomatization is true, and its
“objects” exist—in the only sense of existence relevant to mathematics.  Of course, the
conclusion is defeasible, but that is good enough.  Translated into the present context, the idea is
that all the Hilbertian requires is that the “new” theory introduced by the axiomatization should
fit smoothly into existing mathematical practice.
According to Hallett, Hilbert proposed “consistency” as a mathematically serviceable
gloss on this notion of “smooth fit”, but he never took consistency to be a wholesale replacement
of the intuitive criterion for acceptability, namely that the axiomatization fit into existing
practice.
Proof-theoretic consistency is mathematically tractable, and, of course, a most productive
research program emerged.  A better gloss on the relevant notion of acceptability would be
satisfiability.  We shore up an axiomatization by interpreting it in an established mathematical
theory.  This, in fact, is the practice of Hilbert’s Grundlagen.  As noted, after presenting an
axiomatization, he shows how to interpret it, usually in the real numbers.  Presumably, there is
no serious doubt about the real numbers.
On occasion, existence issues come up in mathematical practice itself.  Since the
nineteenth century, at least, these questions are usually resolved in the way described here, by
interpreting the questioned theory in an established one.  Non-Euclidean geometries were shorn
up by showing how to interpret them in  Euclidean space.
Mark Wilson [1993, §III] illustrates the historical development and acceptance of a
space-time with an “affine” structure on the temporal slices:
. . . the acceptance of . . . non-traditional structures poses a delicate problem for
philosophy of mathematics, viz., how can the novel structures be brought under the
umbrella of safe mathematics?  Certainly, we rightly feel, after sufficient doodles have
been deposited on coffee shop napkins, that we understand the intended structure . . .  But
it is hard to find a fully satisfactory way that permits a smooth integration of non-
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standard structures into mathematics . . . We would hope that “any coherent structure we
can dream up is worthy of mathematical study . . .”  The rub comes when we try to
determine whether a proposed structure is “coherent” or not.  Raw “intuition” cannot
always be trusted; even the great Riemann accepted structures as coherent that later
turned out to be impossible.  Existence principles beyond “it seems okay to me” are
needed to decide whether a proposed novel structure is genuinely coherent . . . [L]ate
nineteenth century mathematicians recognized that . . . existence principles . . . need to
piggyback eventually upon some accepted range of more traditional mathematical
structure, such as the ontological frames of arithmetic or Euclidean geometry.  In . . . our
century, set theory has become the canonical backdrop to which questions of structural
existence are referred.  (pp. 208-209)
Within the community of professional mathematicians, if not philosophers, a set-theoretic proof
of satisfiability resolves any legitimate questions of existence.  In effect, the iterative hierarchy
of set theory has become the canonical proving ground for existence questions.
To sum up, and return to our theme, the holistic proposal is that the only epistemic
burden on Emma is to provide a satisfiability proof of a proposed axiomatization, along the lines
of those in Hilbert’s Grundlagen.  Of course, this approach to the Hilbertian version of Bad
Company is not consistent with the foundational goals of the later Hilbert program.  The
procedure of modeling proposed axiomatizations in the iterative hierarchy cannot assure us that
we won’t be “driven from Cantor’s paradise”, to paraphrase Hilbert [1925], should set theory be
inconsistent or otherwise unsuitable as a mathematical theory.  In a sense, we are relying on
Cantor’s paradise, or at least Zermelo’s paradise, to justify our new axiomatizations.  But, once
again, the mathematical community flies without a safety net—certainly without a net safer than
arithmetic, analysis, and set theory.
There are different ways to extend this holistic proposal to the Scottish neo-logicist
project.  One is to adopt exactly the same criterion of existence:  an abstraction principle is good
once Hero shows it to be satisfiable, and he is free to use any established mathematical theory in
interpreting an abstraction principle.  So Hero is right to be content with Boolos’s demonstration
that (HP) is satisfiable on any countably infinite domain.
This first maneuver is to treat abstraction principles more along the lines of Hilbert-style
implicit definitions, as in §1 above, and it does not resolve the standard Bad Company issues for
neo-logicism.  The parity principle and the nuisance principle are both satisfiable, on any finite
19An abstraction principle is said to be irenic if it is consistent with every conservative
abstraction principle.  Weir [2003] shows that if we interpret the conditions model-theoretically,
in terms of satisfiability, an abstraction principle is stable if and only if it is irenic.
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domain, but both are inconsistent with (HP).  Moreover, this plan misses one of the main points
of (HP), namely to serve as a theory of cardinal number in all of its applications.  To fulfil this
role, the quantifiers have to be unrestricted.
A better way to incorporate the holistic theme into neo-logicism is to require that Hero
show—in set theory presumably—that his proposed abstraction principle is satisfiable on any
sufficiently large domain.  This has become known as a requirement of stability.19  Then we
know that whatever the universe may be, the abstraction principle can be made true on it.  The
parity principle and the nuisance principle fail this test, of course, since they are not satisfiable
on any infinite domain.  If we assume the axiom of choice, then Hume’s Principle passes the
test, since Boolos’s technique shows that (HP) can be satisfied on any infinite, well-ordered
domain.  The abstraction principles introduced for real analysis in Hale [2000] and Shapiro
[2000] pass the test as well (mostly because their quantifiers are restricted).
A third way to incorporate the holistic theme is just to require that Hero show that his
abstraction principle can be interpreted in the iterative hierarchy, or perhaps the iterative
hierarchy with urelements.  The idea is that quantifiers in the abstraction principle should be
interpreted as ranging over all of V, or all of the set-theoretic universe.  It is widely held that any
legitimate mathematical theory can be interpreted on the iterative hierarchy.  If this is so, then
the present test would give abstraction principles the required generality.  If we assume a global
choice principle, then (HP) passes this test as well, along Boolos’s lines.
All of these holistic proposals have Hero make use of other mathematical theories,
usually set theory, in order to shore up abstraction principles.  In  Shapiro [2004], [2005], this is
called an “external” perspective.  Clearly, the program is incompatible with the epistemological
goals of Frege’s logicism.  The point of that, recall, was to show that the basic principles of
arithmetic and real analysis are analytic:  they can be derived from basic principles of logic, plus
definitions.  By relying on an external set theory, we compromise that goal:  the logicist would
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have to show that set theory itself is free from empirical elements, Kantian intuition, etc.  How
could we do that?
Neo-logicism has a similar foundational aim.  One stated purpose is to show that
branches of mathematics can be known a priori, without relying on Kantian intuition, empirical
considerations (like indispensability in science), a direct grasp of mathematical objects, and the
like.  Wright [1997, 210-211] wrote:
Frege’s theorem will . . . ensure . . . that the fundamental laws of arithmetic can be
derived within a system of second-order logic augmented by a principle whose role is to
explain, if not exactly to define, the general notion of identity of cardinal number, and
that this explanation proceeds in terms of a notion which can be defined in terms of
second-order logic.  If such an explanatory principle . . . can be regarded as analytic, then
that should suffice . . . to demonstrate the analyticity of arithmetic.  Even if that term is
found troubling, . . . it will remain that Hume’s Principle—like any principle serving
implicitly to define a certain concept—will be available without significant
epistemological presupposition . . . So one clear a priori route into a recognition of the
truth of . . . the fundamental laws of arithmetic . . . will have been made out . . . Such an
epistemological route . . . would be an outcome still worth describing as logicism . . .
Clearly, this foundational goal is undermined if we adopt the present holistic response to our
issue.  Hero would have to rely on a derivation in set theory, or some other established
mathematical theory, before he can know that his stipulation is good—before he knows that it is
true.  If the background theory, typically set theory, itself has “significant epistemological
presupposition”, then so does the neo-logicist’s arithmetic.
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